Suchergebnisse

Joseph Raz zählt zu den bedeutendsten Autoren der zeitgenössischen Rechtsphilosophie. Im deutschsprachigen Raum ist sein Werk aber kaum bekannt. David Kuch schließt mit der vorliegenden Studie diese Rezeptionslücke. Er unternimmt erstmals eine breitere Aufarbeitung von Raz' Schriften aus rechtswissenschaftlicher Perspektive. Anhand der Primärliteratur spannt er den Bogen vom Handlungsbegriff über die Normentheorie zur Theorie des Rechts als der einzigen sozialen Institution mit umfassendem Autoritätsanspruch. Ist die Entstehung genuin rechtlicher Handlungspflichten möglich? Welche Begründungslasten ergeben sich für sie? Welche Rolle spielen Sanktionen? Joseph Raz verhilft klassischen Themen zu neuer Form, indem er ältere Antwortversuche – etwa von Hart, Bentham, Kelsen und Dworkin – kritisch be- und hinterfragt. Sein Ergebnis: Das Recht nimmt sehr viel mehr Autorität für sich in Anspruch als es besitzt.

InThe Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz has challenged the anti-perfectionism of orthodox liberal political theory and proposed an alternative form of liberalism based on perfectionist moral premises. Raz maintain that his theory of political morality qualifies as a "liberal" theory in view of the pride of place it gives "autonomy" considered as an intrinsic human good. Nevertheless, autonomy, according to Raz, is valuable only when exercised in the pursuit of morally upright ends. The principal point of contact between Raz's theory and leading antiperfectionist versions of liberalism is his endorsement of a qualified version of J. S. Mill's "harm principle." Raz argues that, though the law can and should discourage "victimless immortalities" by noncoercive means, it should not criminalize victimless wrongdoing. The article argues that Raz's claims are strongest where his substantive position is weakest. Perfectionist conservatives and antiperfectionist liberals are correct to maintain that Razian perfectionism cannot supply a ground for rejecting coercive legislation to uphold public morality as a matter of principle.

(Originally published in Review of Politics, 1991, 53, 4.) An examination of Joseph Raz's unique brand of liberalism highlights his rejection of antiperfectionist "neutrality" as neither possible nor desirable & his claim that political action is intended to encourage the pursuit of what is good & discourage the pursuit of what is morally inferior. Raz places great value on both individual liberty & autonomy; however, he rejects the value of autonomy used to make morally evil decisions. He also points out that certain social forms, such as the relationship between parents & their children, need not provide opportunities for choice. Raz's distinctly liberal position is apparent in his advocacy of a modified version of J.S. Mill's "harm principle" that disallows government use of coercive means to discourage individuals from committing "victimless" immoralities. Although Raz opposes victimless immoralities as a matter of moral principle, he emphasizes that the use of criminal law to combat them is morally wrong. Arguments used by Raz to reject paternalistic coercion & conditions that justify it are addressed. J. Lindroth

This chapter presents a response to the account of human rights presented in the previous chapter. It considers the chapter's objections to humanism. It argues that deciding on the proper scope of human rights involves a balancing act: on the one side, only listing rights that are essential to protect basic interests, and ensuring that the interests of the right-holder are properly weighed against the interests of others whose freedom and opportunities would be restricted by recognizing the right; on the other side, ensuring that the protection offered is adequate to protect the right-holder from various likely threats that the modern state order creates. Achieving this balance may require drawing upon both the resources found in humanist and those found in political theories.